On gains to bid-takers from using multi-stage auctions by Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard


*385
4o. 1320 COP
2&
^>-'
BEBR
FACULTY WORKING
PAPER NO. 1320
On Gains to Bid-Takers from Using
Multi-Stage Auctions
Richa rd Engelbrecht- Wigga ns
ary of.
FEB 1 9 198?
UNl
College of Commerce and Business Administration
Bureau of Economic and Business Research
University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign

BEBR
FACULTY WORKING PAPER NO. 1320
College of Commerce and Business Administration
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
January 1987
On Gains to Bid-Takers from Using Multi-Stage Auctions
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Professor
Department of Business Administration
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
http://www.archive.org/details/ongainstobidtake1320enge
On Gains to Bid-Takers from Using Multi-Stage Auctions
Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans
Department of Business Administration
University of Illinois
1206 South Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
December 1986
Abstract
:
/ear, multi-stage auctions of one form or another sell or let
biLllons of dollars worth of goods and contracts. Yet despite the
significance of such auctions, the existing theory of auctions and com-
petitive bidding fails to explain why a bid-taker might prefer a multi-
stage auction to a, possibly simpler, single-stage mechanism. In fact,
the existing theory tends to overlook multi-stage mechanisms altogether.
This paper takes a first step in correcting that omission. We
start with several i L Lustrations of what we \vi 1 1 define to be multi-
stage auctions. All the illustrated auctions allow bidders to acquire
information—or, more generally, to increase the amount of resources
committed to bidding—in stages. We conjecture that al Lowing sucli a
sequential commitment of resources could result in a more efficient
auction than if bidders had no chance to adjust their commitments.
An analytic example illustrates and documents the benefits to the
bid-taker from using a multi-stage auction. In the example, bidders
acquire costly information in stages; a bidder may stop acquiring
additional information as soon as further participation in the auction
would no longer increase his expected net profit. The resulting auc-
tion generates significantly more expected revenue for the bid-taker
than if the bidders al L had to acquire the same amount of information.

Introduction:
Each year, multi-stage auctions of one form or other sell or let a
variety of goods and contracts with a comhined value in the billions of
dollars. For example, before starting the progressive oral bidding for
a rare stamp, the bid-taker may have already accepted written "book bids."
In some real estate auctions, the bid-taker allows bidders to raise
their bids orally once the sealed bids have been opened; the Government
sells timber rights in much the same way. Americana Arts Auctions
(Guarino, 1985) accepts mailed bids, but in the final week before the
deadline, will also report the current high bid—and allow a bidder to
make a bid—over the telephone; the bidding stops once the telephone has
been inactive for at least five minutes after the specified deadline.
(Here, the mailed bid may be of the form "raise my bid by the minimum
increment, as needed, so long as it does not s;o above x;" this gives the
auction a distinct, and unusual second-price flavor.) Cassady (1967)
describes several multi-stage schemes in his compendium of auctions and
competitive bidding.
If we view written proposals as a generalized form of bids, then the
letting of grants and contracts provides additional illustrations of
multi-stage auctions. For example, in developing a new defense system,
the Government may first let a number of contracts to develop prototypes
for the system, and then select a final winner from among the prototype
developers. In a similar vein, IBM awarded grants, each worth millions
of dollars, through a two-stage process in which academic institutions
first submitted abbreviated proposals that determined who would he
funded (by IBM) to develop more detailed proposals.
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Despite this significant use of multi-stage auctions, the existing
theory of auctions and competitive bidding fails to explain why a bid-
taker might prefer a multi-stage mechanism over a possibly simpler
single stage one. In fact, as we will see, the existing theory does
not argue against the use of multi-stage mechanisms; the existing theory
focuses on single-stage mechanisms and largely ignores the possibility
of multi-stage mechanisms. This paper works toward correcting that
omission by examining what actually constitutes a multi-stage auction,
suggesting potential benefits, and documenting and illustrating these
benefits through an example.
Defining "Multi-Stage":
This section isolates the essence of multi-stage mechanisms. We
start by listing various characteristics of the illustrated multi-
stage auctions; characteristics shared by all the illustrations may
differentiate multi-stage auctions from single-stage mechanisms, while
those shared by only a subset of the illustrations may only differen-
tiate one type of multi-stage auction from another. A common charac-
teristic will provide the basis for our definition of multi-stage. The
absence of this characteristic in existing models argues that the exist-
ing theory ignores multi-stage mechanisms as we will have defined them.
We gave as many illustrations of multi-stage auctions as we did in
part to enable us to discern what characteristics differentiate one
multi-stage auction from another as opposed to differentiating multi-
stage auctions as a group from other auctions. In some cases, the
bidder knows the results of earlier stages before proceeding to
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subsequent stages; in other cases, the bidder only knows that someone
might have bid in a previous stage. Thus, we would hope to be able to
characterize multi-stage auctions as something more general than
simply mechanisms that give a bidder sufficient time to process what-
ever information others' bids in an earlier stage may reveal about
the value of or competition for the object being auctioned. In some
cases, one stage determines who will be subsidizied or even allowed to
bid in a subsequent round, while in other examples, an individual may
bid in a later stage without bidding in earlier stages. In some
cases, the type of auction used varies from stage to stage, and in
other cases, it doesn't. In some cases, risk aversion may play an
important role, but in other cases, the bidders would seem to be rela-
tively risk neutral. In some cases, first round bidders have priority
over second round bidders in the case of ties, while in other cases
the nature of the bids changes so much from one stage to the next that
even the concept of "ties" becomes meaningless. Each of these charac-
teristics differentiate one multi-stage auction from another more than
they differentiate multi-stage auctions from other auctions.
Yet these illustrations do all share one characteristic, in each
case, bidders may acquire information—or, more generally, incur any
costs of participating in the auction—in stages. Specifically, in
each case, potential bidders must first decide whether or not to par-
ticipate in the auction at all. Then, in some cases, bidders must
decide how long to participate before dropping out; in other cases,
bidders must decide the form—mailed bid versus in person bidding
—
that their participation wi 1 L take. These decisions each effect a
bidder's total cost of participation.
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Other auctions, auctions that we might have tempted to classify as
single-stage, also exhibit a similar multi-stage flavor. For example,
in an oral auction, a bidder might start with a vague idea of how high
he might be willing to bid and only expend the mental energy to refine
this limit if and when it looks like he has significant chance of
winning the object. Even in a sealed bid auction, a potential bidder
might acquire information and refine his estimate of the object's
value in stages, stopping this sequential process (and possibly bid-
ding) only when he runs out of time, or when the expected costs of
continuing exceed the expected benefits. In fact, all auctions known
to this author (with the possible exception of certain, very carefully
controlled laboratory experiments) allow for some degree of sequen-
tial decision making.
On the other hand, the existing theory of auctions and competitive
bidding tends to overlook the sequential nature of bidders' decisions.
Indeed, the theory—as surveyed by Engelbrecht-Uiggans (1980) and
McAfee and McMillan (1985), or as contributed to by Vickrey (1961),
Myerson (1981), and Milgrom and Weber (1982)—focuses on models in
which bidders are simply given some specified type and amount of
information. Not only don't the bidders acquire information in stages,
they have no choice in what or how much information they acquire. (We
might calL these zero-stage models.) Lee (1984) Matthews (1984), and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1986) do incorporate a bidder's decision on how
much information to buy, or whether to buy any information at all, into
their models. However, their models give bidders only a single oppor-
tunity to decide how much information they acquire, and might there-
fore be most appropriately labelled as single-stage models.
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In short, the existing theory basically ignores the multi-stage
nature of auctions. By not allowing bidders to make sequential deci-
sions on acquiring information—or, more generally, on incurring any
costs of participating in the auction—the theory fails to illuminate
what or how much information bidders might ultimately acquire at
equilibrium. Moreover, the theory cannot illuminate the nature and
extent of any benefits to the bidders or to the bid-taker from letting
bidders make sequential decisions.
This paper takes a first step in correcting this omission of the
current theory. We do so by presenting and solving a specific mathe-
matical example of a multi-stage auction model. In the example, the
bid-taker should expect a signficantly greater revenue from bidders at
equilibrium (with respect not only to bids, but also with respect to
the amount of information acquired) than if all bidders were required
to acquire the same amount of information (as would be the case in more
traditional models.) More than simply documenting and illustrating
one reason why bid-takers might benefit from using multi-stage auctions
such as we initially illustrated, this example underscores that sequen-
tial decisions can play an important role in an auction and that the
multi-stage aspects of real auctions need further study.
Developing an Example:
Several considerations governed our search for a mathematical
example. To provide as general and simple an explanation as possible
for the existence of multi-stage mechanisms, we 1) assumed the bid-
taker and bidders to be risk neutral, and 2) focused on the one common
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element that we identified for multi-stage auctions—they allow bid-
ders to acquire information in stages. In addition, we only con-
sidered cases in which bidders, by acquiring additional information
and refining their value estimates, might change who estimates the
object to be worth the most; indeed, if bidders would already know by
the end of the first stage who would ultimately win the object, then
this author would be hard pressed to come up with a simple argument
why anyone would ever incur the cost of acquiring additional infor-
mation. (This means that our example will necessarily differ from the
common values models used so far by others when studying the infor-
mation acquisition process.) Finally, we looked for an example that
illuminates the benefits of allowing bidders to acquire their
information—and refine their value estimates—in stages, by empha-
sizing the factors that lead to these benefits, and by suppressing
detaiLs or considerations that might make the example more "realistic"
at the expense of confounding the solution or interpretation of the
example.
These considerations led to the following conditions, which, taken
together, define the structure of our subsequent example:
1) A single object is offered for sale. Rather than writing "how
much more the bidder values the object than the seller values it," we
write "the bidder's value" as if the seller had a value of zero for the
object. This simplifies the exposition without any loss of generality.
2) To participate in the auction, a bidder must have some private
information about his value for the object. Indeed, the work of
Engelbrecht-Wiggans , Milgrom and Weber (1983) argues that in a common
value setting, a bidder without anv private information should expect
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zero profit at equilibrium and might as well not bid at all. While
this argument applies to many practical situations, it wilL not apply
to our example with its independent information and values; we simply
suggest that requiring bidders to have at least some private informa-
tion, however arbitrary the conditions might seem in our examnle , has
some basis in reality.
3) Individual i has an unknown value v eaual to x y for the
i i i
obiect. The x ' s are known to be independent outcomes of a random
i
variable X with known cumulative distribution function F(x). Each y,
is known to be equal to unity with a known probability p, and zero
otherwise, independent of the x.'s and of the other y.'s.
1 l
4) Private information comes in two flavors—imperfect and perfect
By paying a known fee of c , individual i sees x.
,
giving him an esti-
mate of px
.
for his expected value for the object. By paying an addi-
tional, known fee of c , individual i sees y and discovers whether he
2 i
has a value of zero or x for the object. Rather than see x and y at
l i " i
the same time, at a cost of c + c individual i might as well buy the
information sequentially. We do not allow anyone to see their y. with-
out first seeing their x .
i
5) Individuals consider joining the auction (by paying c
1
and see-
ing their x. ) one by one, knowing how many others have already joined
the auction before them. At equilibrium, an individual will pay the
fee of c and become a bidder if and only if so doing would give him a
non-negative expected profit net of information costs. Thanks to the
symmetry of the assumptions, no bidder will ever want to withdraw from
the auction simply because others entered the auction after he did and
thereby drove down his expected profit.
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6) Each bidder submits a single sealed bid. In practice, bidders
might submit several bids—the first bid might be based on the informa-
tion available in the first stage, the second bid on information avail-
able in the second stage, and so on. However, in our example, any bid-
der who, based on his current information, decides to obtain additional
information could wait to submit a bid that has any probability of
winning until after he has acquired all the information that he ever
acquires. Even if we were to require bidders in our example to bid in
each stage, a bidder need only bid at most two different amounts—
a
trivial amount in early stages, and a serious amount once he has all
his information. We only care about the single serious amount that
each bidder bids. Thus, we assume, without any loss of generality,
that each bidder submits only a single bid.
7) If anyone bids at least equal to the known reservation price r,
the highest bidder wins the object. Otherwise, the seller keeps the
object
.
8) The winner, if any, pays the seller an amount equal to the
second highest bid, or the reservation price r, whichever is larger.
Given the independence of bidders' information, this second price
mechanism might be an appropriate model for the commonly used progres-
sive oral auction. More importantly, for this second-price auction
with its independent information, no bidder can do better than simply
bidding equal to his expected value for the object given whatever
information he has acquired; this existence of a dominant strategy
bidding equilibrium makes the problem sufficiently tractable so that we
can derive the equilibrium information acquisition strategy and ful Ly
analyze the example.
-9-
Solving the Example:
We consider three cases of the example, and in each case assume X
to be distributed uniformly on the unit interval. In the first case,
bidders may not acquire perfect information, while in the second case,
bidders must acquire perfect information; in fact, these turn out to
be single-stage auctions. In the third case, bidders themselves decide
whether or not to acquire perfect information; here we will need to
derive the equilibrium information acquisition strategy—a strategy
which, if followed by all bidders, has each bidder acquire perfect
information if and only if so doing increases his expected profit (net
of all information costs). We will ultimately see that for at least
one specific parameterization of the example, the two-stage mechanism
of the third case with a reservation price of zero generates a greater
expected revenue for the bid-taker at equilibrium than the single-stage
auctions of the first two cases can under any reservation price.
The solution process draws repeatedly on something that we will
call the "market value" of the object. In particular, for each fixed
number n of bidders, define the market value V(n) as equal to the expected
value of the largest of the n bids. Note that the market value impli-
citly depends on the information acquisition strategy of the bidders;
for a fixed information acquisition strategy, the independent private
values nature of our example makes V(n) an increasing function of n.
We will also refer to the difference between V(n) and the bidders'
total costs of information as the "net (social) value"; by the defini-
tion of how bidders enter the auction, the bid-taker's expected revenue
cannot exceed this net value.
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Even with all the simplifying assumptions, solving the example
takes considerable effort. We break the solution process into three
major steps, described below. We leave the actual derivations to the
next section.
1) Calculate the market value V (n) for the case in which no one
acquires perfect information, and the market value V (n) for the case
in which all bidders acquire perfect information.
2) For the two-stage case where the bidders decide whether or not
to acquire perfect information,
a) Show that for an appropriately chosen constant a, each
bidder i following the strategy "acquire perfect information if and
only if my x. at least equals a" yields an equilibrium.
b) For any fixed p, n and a, characterize what c would give
rise to this a.
c) Derive the market value V (n) for the two-stage auction at
equilibrium in terms of p, n, and a (or, equivalently , in terms of p, n,
and c )
.
2
d) Derive the bidders' expected profit at equilibrium and
characterize what c would give rise to any specified number n of bid-
ders entering the auction.
The next section contains the actual derivations—these may be
skipped by anyone who trusts their accuracy and is interested only in
the results. Then in the final section we go to step 3—we consider
the case p = a = 1/2 and n = A. Specifically, we calculate V (n) for
n = 3 and 4, and use these values to calculate the bid-taker's
expected revenue from the two-stage auction with a reserve price of
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zero and to calculate what c, and c„ would give rise to a = — and n = 4.
For these c. and o. we then calculate the maximum net value possible
in the two single-stage auctions in which all bidders have the same
—
either perfect or imperfect—level of information. This maximum
bounds how much revenue the bid-taker could expect from either single-
stage auction. The bound turns out to be significantly less than the
bid-taker's expected revenue at equilibrium in the two-stage case.
The Derivations:
This section follows the steps outlined above.
1) If a bidder has only imperfect information, and if each bidder
follows the dominant strategy of bidding equal to his expected value for
z=» dPr(all x. 's z)
the object given his information, then V (n) = f p»z» -\ »dz
Z=— 00
=
"
-
. for X distributed uniformly on the unit interval. On the other
n+1
hand, if each bidder has perfect information, and if each bidder follows
the dominant strategy of bidding equal to his expected value for the
object given his information, then
x=°° z=l
V (n) = E[ max x. ] = / (1-Pr(all x ' s <_ z)dz = / (l-( ( l-p)+pz)
n
) )dz
0<i<n x=-°° z=0
= 1 -,—-r-t-(l-(l-p) ) for X distributed uniformly on the unit
pCn+l;
interval.
2) For the two-stage case,
a) To verify that "acquire perfect information if and only if
my x.
_> a" yields an equilibrium for some a, start by defining H(y|x) =
Pr(all n-1 competing bids y|x. = x). Note that for our example,
H(y|x) is independent of x and may be written as H(y). Now, without
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perfect information, bidder i would have an expected value E (x ) =
I i
J (px.-z)dH(z) . On the other hand, if bidder i plans to acquire perfect
z<px . 1
information, but has not yet done so, he would have an expected value
E (x.) = (l-p)»0 + p / (x.-z)dH(z). But, the expected value of per-
p x z<x x
— 1
feet information (over imperfect information) is simply the difference
E (x ) - E (x ). Differentiating this difference with respect to x
P ill i
yields p f dH(z) - / pd(z) which simplifies to p(H(x. )-H(px . ) ) , which
z<x z<px. x 1
— 1 — l
must be non-negative since H(y) is a non-decreasing function of y and
- p 1. Thus, the expected value of perfect information is a non-
decreasing function of x. , and the strategy "acquire perfect information
if and only if my x. a" will be in equilibrium if c = E (x.=a) -
E_(x =a).
I i
b) To derive an expression for c ? in terms of a, p, and n,
start by deriving the following explicit expression for H(y):
f
for y \
!
\ (£ + (l-a)(l-p)) n_1 for < y < pa
P — —
H(y) = S, (1-p + pa) for pa - y < a
1
n-1
( 1-p + py) for a < y • 1
1 for y > 1
V
" y=pa
_
Now, c = E (a) - E_(a) = p[ f (a-y)—(^+ (l-a)(l-p)) n dy + + 0] + (1-p).
2 P I
y=Q
dy p
- f (pa-y)—(1+ (l-a)(l-p)) n Xdy
y=0 y P
y=pa
d -1
which reduces to (1-p) / y-r~(— + (l-a)(l-p))
n
dy
y=0
dy P
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and "simplifies" to 2ik^l[ (na-1+p-pa) (l-p+pa) n X + ( (1-a) (1-p)
)
n
]
For the case of a = p = 1/2, c = -rr-[l+(2n-3) »3 ].
l . n+i
n4
c) For fixed a, p, and n,
y=l y=l
V (n) = f yy- Pr(all bids _< y)dy = / (1-Pr(all bids <_ y))dyT
y=0 ' y y=0
y=pa y=a y=l
= / <l-(£ + (l-a)(l-p)) n )dy + / (l-(l-p+pa) n )dy + / ( l-( l-p+py) n
y=0 y=pa y=a
which "simplifies" to
n+1 ,
,
x n
p
1 " TOT + P((1
'a
nll'
P))n+
+ ilZSf^^ " P(l-P^a)-a(l-p)(n+D).
For the case of a = p = 1/2,
v (^ - i 2 . l+3
n(7-2n)
V (n; - 1 - —
-r- + ~rrT n+1 2(n+l)4n+1
d) In general for second price, independent private values
(distributed according to G(
• ) ) auctions, the expected market value V(n)
equals fynG (y)dG(y), and the bid-taker's expected revenue at equilib-
rium with a reservation price of zero equals fyn(n-l) ( l-G(y) )G(y ) dG(y),
which reduces to nV(n-l)-(n-l)V(n) . The difference between these
two—namely, n[V(n)-V(n-l) ]—must equal the bidders' combined expected
profit gross of information costs. (Note, as might be expected, each
bidder has an expected profit of V(n)-V(n-1)—the expected increase in
market value due to this additional bidder's presence.) Therefore, to
get exactly n participants and to have the last entrant drive each bid-
der's expected profit (net of information costs) down to exactly zero,
we should set c. = V(n)-V(n-l)-( l-G(a) )c
;?
. (For a slightly smaller c,
,
-14-
each of the n bidders would have a positive expected profit. As c,
decreases further, eventually another bidder would enter the market when
so doing would again drive the bidders' profits to zero.)
Results and Discussion:
For a = p = 1/2 and X distributed uniformly on the unit interval,
V (3) = 0.513672, and V (4) = 0.5921875. This gives the bid-taker an
expected revenue of very nearly .2781255 when n = 4. A c~ = 0.0332031
gives rise to a = 1/2, while a c. = 0.061914 gives rise to n = 4
bidders participating.
If each bidder has imperfect information, and each must pay c, =
0.061914 for his imperfect information, then an n equal to 2 maximizes
the net value V (n)-c,n from this one-stage auction. The maximum net
value equals 0.210102. (As it turns out, at a reservation price equal to
zero, the 2 bidders' expected profit would be less than their informa-
tion costs, so the bid-taker would have to subsidize them in order to
get two bidders in the auction. For n = 1 and a reservation price of
zero, the net value equals 0.198086, and the lone bidder would make a
strictly positive expected profit.) Thus, the bid-taker could not have
an expected revenue greater than 0.210102 in this one-stage auction,
and would probably have to settle for a somewhat smaller expected reve-
nue. Note that the bid-taker's expected revenue in the two-stage auc-
tion exceeds this one-stage auction's bound by approximately 32 percent.
Now, if each bidder has perfect information, and each paid c, + c~
= 0.0951171 for his information, then the maximum possible net value
V (n)-(c,+(l-a)c~) of 0.2464325 occurs when n = 3. Again, this net
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value bounds the bid-taker's expected revenue from this one-stage auc-
tion. In particular, the expected revenue from the two-stage auction
exceeds this second bound by approximately 13 percent—not as much as
before, but still a significant amount.
What makes the expected revenue to the bid-taker in the two-stage
auction with a reservation price of zero exceed the expected revenue
possible at any reservation price in either single-stage auction?
Basically, the multi-stage auction allows bidders who are unlikely to
win to so discover at a low cost. Thus, for any fixed n, the bidders
would spend less on information than if all bidders acquired perfect
information. This results in more bidders being able to afford to
participate in the auction, thereby driving vip the market value above
what it would had been had the same amount of money been spent by a
smaller number of bidders each acquiring perfect information. As a
result, the two-stage auction generates a greater revenue for the bid-
taker than the single-stage auction in which all bidders have perfect
information.
Alternatively, if all bidders have imperfect information, then
there is so large a probability that the bidder who has the highest
estimated value is not the bidder who actually has the highest value,
that a very inefficient auction results. In fact, even though the
imperfect information costs less than the perfect information, the
corresponding reduction in auction efficiency and bidders' profits
means that in our example the equilibrium in the low information case
cannot support as many bidders as the equilibrium when all bidders
have perfect information. In total, going from imperfect information
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to perfect information, increases the market value faster than the
bidders' equilibrium costs and profits.
Of course, the bid-taker need not prefer a two-stage auction to a
simpler single-stage auction even if it does generate a greater expected
revenue. The extra cost of running a two-stage auction may more than
offset the gains in expected revenue. Thus, our analysis suggests that
bid-takers would be most likely to prefer multi-stage auctions to
single-stage auctions when the object to be sold has a large value
compared to the costs of running an auction, and the costs of infor-
mation are large enough so that only a few bidders would tend to par-
ticipate in the auction. This seems to be the case in the real world
illustrations with which we started this paper.
-17-
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